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Abstract: 
In light of the 2014 Ecuador-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council 
to examine the link between Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, in this 
paper I review the first major discussion at the United Nations of the role of 
multinational corporations. The report on Multinational Corporations in World 
Development (1973) for the UN Department of Economic and Social affair launched 
the (then) new UN Centre on Transnational Corporations. I examine the report in 
some detail, compare and contrast this with the Ecuadorian resolution from 2014, 
and reflect on the continuities and changes in attempts to regulate the conduct of 
global corporations over the forty years between these two moments. 
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 In the current period of upheaval in the global economic system, the (political) 
regulation of the corporation has become a subject to which commentators return 
again and again; critics claim there is insufficient global regulation of the conduct of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) generally and specifically around taxation, human 
rights and environmental impact; supporters of the contribution MNCs make to the 
global economy warn that formalised (legal) rules are inefficient relative to the agility 
of self-regulation and as such would represent a general cost to global society. 
These debates are hardly novel and can be tracked back for at least forty years if not 
longer. In this article I compare two moments in this debate; one at a time when 
these issues were starting to be more widely articulated on the global political stage 
and a second moment 40 years later. This allows me to focus on what has changed 
and what has stayed the same in these debates. Recognising that the policy debates 
around the interaction between corporate activity and human rights, environmental 
impact and taxation are complex and ongoing, I have deployed an approach (set out 
below) that I have developed at length elsewhere to identify two particular moments 
that seem to represent key shifts in the manner in which the potential (international) 
regulation of corporations is conceived.  
 
In the first section I briefly review and (re)present this approach that informs my 
political economic analysis. The following section explores the first of the two 
moments identified: The United Nations’ report published as Multinational 
Corporations in World Development; I examine both its content and its impact. Then 
I move forward forty years to examine the relatively recent Ecuadorian resolution at 
the UN Human Rights Council to prepare the ground for formalised international 
regulation of MNCs around human rights. In the final section I compare and contrast 
these two moments to suggest some conclusions on the progress and shape of the 
engagement between MNCs and various aspects of the political programme of 
global governance. 
 
Critical Realism and ecology of regulation around MNCs 
 
In previous work I have deployed Margaret Archer’s approach to conceptualizing the 
relationship between ideas and their articulation by ‘social forces’, and material 
conditions. Most valuably, Archer refuses the temptation to identify either structure 
(institution) or agency as the final determining factor in social relations.1 She argues 
that focusing on agency alone and offering a ‘bottom up’ causal explanation would 
make ‘no allowances for inherited structures, their resistance to change, the 
influence they exert on attitudes to change, and crucially..., the delineation of agents 
capable of seeking change’.2 At the beginning of any particular chosen/posited 
sequence of history there are structures/institutions carried forward, reflecting 
previous political economic settlements regarding the manner in which (in this case) 
the regulation of global corporations might be understood in a particular (historical) 
situation. There are always agents who are disadvantaged as well as those who 
manage to capture the benefits of the system at that (or any) particular juncture.  
 
Historically extant social institutions are themselves the products of previous clashes 
of social forces, previous interactions of ideas, material capabilities and institutional 
practices. Agents’ actions may be the immediate cause of specific moments of 
settlement, but they also remain embedded in these larger structures, including 
material conditions, state institutions and the structure(s) of global capitalism, that 
 both constrain and empower. Indeed, such change itself can alter agents’ interests if 
it renders existing institutions less useful and agents begin to be harmed by a 
continuation of the status quo. Archer stressed that ‘all structural influences... are 
mediated to people by shaping the situation in which they find themselves’,3 using 
the tools (language and rules) available to them. The key issue is the difference 
between the inherited structures (playing out in institutionalized settlements) and the 
continuing (or changing) interests of specific agents.  
 
Structure/institutions and accumulated social facts condition but do not determine 
agency. The power of agency lies in its ‘capacities for articulating shared interests, 
organizing for collective action, generating social movements and exercising 
corporate influence in decision-making’.4 This leads Archer to identify two types of 
agency: primary and corporate (which to avoid confusion here I shall call ‘collective’) 
agency. Primary agents have neither organized nor articulated their interests and 
seldom participate strategically in shaping or reshaping structure. By contrast, 
collective agents are ‘those who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to 
themselves and others, and have organized in order to get it; [only they] can engage 
in concerted action to re-shape or retain the structural or cultural features in 
question’.5 In this sense, Archer argues, affected primary agents must develop 
collective forms, to engage effectively in the political process of structural change or 
defence. Collective agents ‘pack more punch in defining and re-defining structural 
forms, and are key links in delimiting whether systemic fault lines (incompatibilities) 
will be split open... or will be contained’.6 In order to be successful, agents need 
some form of organization and the ability to articulate their interests. They need 
‘technical’ expertise, political power and access to resources, including the very 
institutions they may wish to change. Agents may become dissatisfied with the status 
quo, recognizing that the structural incongruities threaten to reduce benefits and 
power, but unless they are able to organize a collective response they will be unlikely 
to be able to effectively challenge more formalized groupings. 
 
Thus, following Archer: where there is a mismatch between the structurally or 
institutionally available benefits and the politicized interests of marginalized agents, 
this may be translated into tensions and strains within the system, which are then 
experienced as practical exigencies by agents whose interests are vested 
in the impeded institutions.... Their situations are moulded in critical 
respects by operational obstructions which translate into practical 
problems, frustrating those upon whose day-to-day situations they 
impinge, and confronting them with a series of exigencies which hinder 
the achievement or satisfaction of their vested institutional interests.7 
In these confrontations the shift in ideas about the institutional settlement starts to 
become more apparent. While the beneficiaries will attempt to maintain the 
universality of the systems of justification of the status quo, the challengers will seek 
to identify the emerging practical (real) gaps in the institutional reflection of the 
dominant ideas of the current settlement. Thus, and following this analytical 
approach, in both the moments I discuss below the shift in the perception of what 
was needed politically was driven by shifts in knowledge about, and judgments of, 
corporate practice and actions. In both cases the prior, and general normative 
settlement around the regulation of corporate behaviour was undermined (or 
contradicted) by the actuality, revealed by the Church Committee (and others) in the 
 first moment, and as directly experienced by the government of Ecuador in the 
second.  
 
Florian Wettstein has argued that increasingly multinational corporations are playing 
a political role in global system and as such should be subject to the same checks 
and balances as other equally powerful organisations as part of a move to a more 
democratic and deliberative form of global governance; what is required is some 
form of countervailing power. This would likely involve a ‘cosmopolitan system of 
laws and regulations [that] would establish global incorporation combined with global 
taxation…[and] effectively eliminate multinational corporations’ capabilities to evade 
taxes and regulations’.8 For John Ruggie this asks ‘too much from the system of 
international public governance’ leaving him to prefer on pragmatic grounds a 
combination of national remedies around human rights with stronger normative 
leadership by the institutions of global governance.9 As this suggests, and following 
Larry Catá Backer’s characterisation, we can usefully see the regulatory environment 
that encompasses MNCs as an ecology that adds three separate interweaving 
elements to states’ regulatory scope: corporations own internal governance 
functions;10 the emergence of private regulatory capacity; and the development of 
multi-stakeholder regulatory (autonomous) systems.11 We can then see the (revived) 
interest in formalised and positive international law in the second moment that I 
discuss below as a reflection of specific agents’ judgement about the regulatory 
efficacy of such ecology. 
 
This ecology is perhaps most developed in the realm of human rights and the 
posited responsibilities of global corporations in this regard. As Nadia Bernaz sums it 
up, in her survey of the issue; the regulatory intent ‘rests on two simple ideas. First, 
business entities should refrain from violating human rights. Second, if they do end 
up violating human rights, victims must be provided with a remedy’.12 As Bernaz sets 
out, this ecology or network of regulatory instruments has a long history, and it now 
seems clear that the practices of large corporations will not be altered significantly 
other than through a combination of formal legal, soft law and civil society regulatory 
developments.13 However, as Archer’s perspective would suggest, it is also likely 
that the balance between ecological elements will shift in relation to the 
experience(s) of particular actors, organisations or political communities, perhaps 
most clearly to the shape and extent of what Bernaz refers to as the ‘accountability 
gap’. This lack of accountability results from three factors: firstly, where corporations 
are (forced to or voluntarily) collude with host states, legal recourse in the state 
where abuse takes place is compromised by the involvement of the host state itself; 
secondly, if there are significant barriers in the way of victims can seek recourse via 
the legal systems of corporations’ home states; and lastly when there is a lack of an 
international mechanism of (legal) accountability.14  
 
Therefore in this article I examine two moments in the history of this ecology: the first 
represents the moment when its complex character started to cohere for policy 
makers and others focussing on the conduct of MNCs; the second is much more 
recent and may represent a key shift (back) towards an aspiration to strengthen the 
formal legal element of the regulatory system.15 The question I seek to explore is not 
whether regulation would be legitimate, but rather to assess what has changed (and 
what has not) in the political perception of the ‘problem’ of regulating MNCs’ activities 
and behaviours between these two moments divided as they are  by forty years of 
 global political economic history. By exploring two moments in the development of 
what Wettstein has called the ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ (and I have referred to 
as an ecology or regulation) whose components can ‘make valuable contributions to 
the realisation of people’s rights’,16 I aim to illuminate the manner in which some 
aspects of the first moment’s analysis and prognosis of the issues have become 
normalised, and others have continued to be unsettled and contentious. In Archer’s 
sense it seems to me that we can usefully regard these moments as relations 
between continuity and contradiction in the manner in which social actors interested 
in the operation and practices of global corporations have returned to formal 
regulation after the promise(s) of self-regulation has been (relatively) unfulfilled, and 
by doing so account for actions that seek to rebalance what initially might seem a 
relatively settled ecology of regulation.  
 
Multinational Corporations in World Development (1974) 
 
At the end of the 1960s and into the early 1970s it was becoming increasingly 
obvious that large, internationally focussed corporations could wield significant 
influence across the world, and that sometimes this was achieved via dubious 
means.17 As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have commented, ‘the mid-1970s 
saw a frenzy of code and guideline development on various abuses of power by 
[MNCs] in the climate created by the revelations of the Church Committee’, and 
specifically the reports of ITT’s actions in Chile.18 Reflecting this mood of disquiet, 
and the growing aspirations for a new international economic order (NIEO), on 28th 
July 1972 the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted 
resolution 1721 requesting that the Secretary General appoint a Group of Eminent 
Persons to examine the role of MNCs in the international economy, their impact on 
development, and the implications for international regulation. Fortuitously, at this 
time détente also meant that the idea of international cooperation, between the 
developed countries of the ‘west’, and communist countries of the ‘east’, as well as 
developing states, was relatively well-received and enhanced the potential to build a 
cooperative approach.19 
 
The Group of Eminent Persons’ remit stretched from considering recommendations 
for states’ governments, to more general ‘recommendations for appropriate 
international action’.20 Their work was framed by a report that sought both to map the 
contours of the international corporate economy, and also make a range of initial 
recommendations for suitable actions.21 Recognising the likely interest in this 
research and policy analysis the UN arranged for the report to be published by 
Praeger Publishers in New York in 1974. This report prompted the establishment of 
the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, and the UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations.22 Moreover, the report set the agenda for discussion of 
both the Group of Eminent Persons and the wider community of scholars, 
commentators and activists who had started to focus on the activities of MNCs.  
 
The report published as Multinational Corporations in World Development (MCWD), 
was the first major report from the UN on the issue of multinational corporations; in 
the words of Tagi Sagafi-Nejad and John Dunning, it was perhaps the 
most comprehensive review of the state of knowledge on [MNCs] at that 
time and was ground-breaking in its scope, content and format… The 
range of policy issues it covered set the agenda for subsequent years, 
 and the concepts it considered became springboards for later UN work … 
[and it] was explicit, detailed and prescriptive.23 
That said, it is also admirably balanced in its treatment of MNCs, leaving criticisms of 
(then) recent scandals to one side, and working hard to recognise the positives as 
well as the negatives of MNC involvement in many states’ economies. The report 
had three main elements: the first third was intended to introduce and explore the 
character of MNCs; the middle section deals with their impact in international 
relations, as well as identifying some tensions; and the final segment makes some 
recommendations ‘toward a program of action’. The report starts from the recognition 
that MNCs can be valuable to economic development (nationally and internationally) 
while also acknowledging that their conduct and activities may privilege or advance 
certain interests at the cost of others. While resisting an unalloyed anti-MNC positon, 
it is premised on the need to develop international policies to guide and shape how 
MNCs interact with host states and other non-state economic actors, and perhaps 
most significantly to address what Bernaz has called the ‘accountability gap’.24 
 
The report begins by setting out a range of descriptive issues; noting the size of the 
largest MNCs, with which the report is interested; recognising that many of these 
largest of MNCs operate in oligopolistic markets,25 while also identifying the central 
role of affiliates for their operations. It then moves on to examine the extent of MNCs 
involvement in the world economy, suggesting that in 1971, MNCs accounted for 
around a fifth of world value added,26 although foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
uneven both geographically and by industrial sector. Thus MCWD suggests that the 
‘typical multinational corporation is a large-sized, predominantly oligopolistic, firm 
with sales running into hundreds of millions of dollars and affiliates spread over 
several countries’.27 These MNCs were mainly based in the developed countries of 
the world economy with over half (by share value) from the USA. In the report’s 
analysis the spread of investment and activity was influenced strongly by historical 
ties (often but not always relating to colonial holdings), and overall MNCs played a 
key role in intertwining the international economy across developed, un(der)-
developed states and the then socialist bloc.28 Reflecting the manner in which at that 
point MNCs had organised their international activities, the report concludes that 
most invest abroad either to gain access to raw materials, or to manufacture (both to 
reduce costs and to gain better access to new markets).29 The report posits 
increasing formality of structure and control of MNCs’ own networks, following 
models and practices developed by US MNCs, and notes that transfer pricing 
practices distorted and obscured the profitability of various parts of these 
organisations.30 This leads to a conclusion that the ‘need to exercise control is 
reflected in the preference of multinational corporations for wholly owned 
subsidiaries, although control can at times be achieved through joint ventures and 
even minority positions’.31 As the report suggests, at this point MNCs were often 
relatively simple organisations and as such relatively easily identified and described. 
 
Recognising that MNCs had an ‘almost boundless capacity for adaptation’ to 
changing circumstances,32 the report then moves on to examine how they helped 
shape international relations and how they adapted to this changing context. 
Certainly, MNCs remained embedded in a system of national economies, but even in 
the 1970s it was clear that there were significant avenues of global influence. Firstly, 
managers and other senior executives of MNCs moved within an international 
network that also included policy makers, legislators and other members of national 
 elites. While this allowed MNCs to mobilise influence, MCWD also notes that 
nationally significant economic activity carried out by MNCs was managed and 
controlled from outside the jurisdiction of most host states, producing a set of 
dependent and interdependent economic relations.33 This leads the report to set out 
some areas where tensions between host states and MNCs could be identified.  
 
Focusing largely (although not exclusively) on natural resources the authors of 
MCWD suggest that states found their sovereignty was often compromised by the 
need to engage MNCs to fully exploit natural resources.34 Equally, the ability of 
states’ governments to develop and follow planned economic policy might be 
compromised by the actions and/or requirements of investing MNCs, leading to a 
requirement to negotiate and compromise over developmental strategies.35 These 
tensions were particularly pronounced in the areas of technology and innovation, and 
in the development of high(er) skills in the workforce. Few MNCs conducted 
research and development in host states, and the utilisation of technology fees and 
licenses was often a cost on local production.36 Interestingly as regards labour, the 
report suggests that for many states MNCs labour practices (higher than local 
wages, better training) served to unhelpfully distort local labour markets.37 The report 
concluded that in 
many host countries there is a growing dissatisfaction over playing a 
peripheral role. Host developing countries are moreover suspicious of the 
multinational corporations’ style of doing things. Their financial power and 
easy access to the top hierarchy of government and business may be 
used, openly or covertly, to influence the domestic political process to 
their liking.38 
For some social elites, the alliance of MNCs with other elements of the local political 
community was regarded as an impediment to locally planned development 
trajectories; the report therefore concluded that the political reception of MNCs’ 
activity in any state was unlikely to be uniform. 
 
The report then moves to discuss the relations between MNCs and their home 
countries, although unsurprisingly here the issues were somewhat different. For the 
home countries the difficulty was that MNCs moved large amounts of revenue 
around their networks producing, the data suggested, increases in exchange rate 
volatility due the practical demands for foreign currency and the repatriation of 
profits/earnings.39 Likewise the then developing operation of international supply 
chains and the flow of intermediate and end products around these networks, 
distorted the overall international market position of hosts states, with less than 
predictable impact(s) on the balance of trade.40 These issues prompted a concern 
with the question of taxation, the use of transfer pricing to minimise tax exposure and 
the varying treatment of corporate revenue/profits between different jurisdictions, 
leading to the conclusion that while there was yet to be a crisis around this issue in 
the early 1970s, ‘there is a tendency to long-term deterioration that could eventually 
result in drastic unilateral actions by governments, or even  by the corporations 
themselves in respect of their investment decisions’.41 However, forty years ago the 
distorting influence of tax competition was regarded as unhelpful to both states and 
MNCs. 
 
Having set out the range of knowledge and information that the report team had 
been able to access on behalf of the report’s primary intended audience – the Group 
 of Eminent Persons empanelled by ECOSOC resolution 1721 – the final section of 
MCWD provided a suggested programme of action. The report’s researchers 
regarded the continued thinness of reliable information about the activities of MNCs 
as a major hindrance, but the report does identify a range of actions at national and 
regional level. These ranged from addressing issues of expropriation and 
nationalisation, to regional guidelines around technology transfer (taken furthest at 
the time by the Andean group of six South American countries), foreign investment 
and required levels of local participation in new ventures, while the European 
Community (as was) had been more concerned with reigning in inter-corporate 
collusion and restrictive practices.42 Although accepting that some MNCs had 
modified their behaviour in light of pressure from host states, regional actors, and in 
some cases labour unions, it was also clear that there was a significant gap in 
attention to MNCs activities that matched the scope and reach of those activities, 
leading the report’ authors to conclude:  
No matter how wisely the host and home countries deal with multinational 
corporations, and how socially responsive the behaviour of these 
corporations may be, tensions and conflicts will inevitably arise and 
international machinery and procedures must be devised for dealing with 
them.43 
This prompted seven recommendations for action at the international level. 
 
Firstly the research team behind MCWD suggested the establishment of an 
international forum (under the auspices of ECOSOC) to generally gather, share and 
publicise research into the activities of MNCs. Secondly, this forum should also 
support an ‘information centre’ that would seek to conduct new research to develop 
authoritative data on transfer pricing, the international division of labour within MNCs 
(both technical and managerial), reliable statistics on intra-corporate financial flows, 
and a clearer understanding of the policy influence wielded by MNCs in both home 
and host countries.44 Thirdly, the report saw a need for a wider range of technical 
cooperation between states, to help them counter MNCs’ ability to mobilise influence 
(and more practically technical expertise) across their operations. Fourthly, MCWD 
envisaged the development of a code of conduct that would be progressively 
widened and strengthened, cumulating in a code with organisational backing similar 
to the (then operative) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, allowing for some 
form of enforcement and sanction.45 Fifthly, the report argued for a register of MNCs 
and (sixthly) the development (building on such a register) of an (international) law of 
international corporations, to establish MNC’s formal international legal subjectivity, 
which would also lastly, support a UN-mandated dispute resolution (arbitration) 
mechanism.46 While the report’s authors recognised some of these proposals were 
far reaching, they also noted that the informational and technical assistance 
proposals had little to obstruct them.  
 
Indeed, the relatively prompt establishment of the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) reflected the first two proposals directly. The 
UNCTC, and other developments contributed to a widening in subsequent years of 
the exchange of information and advice on MNC activities, but the posited code of 
conduct while subject to a series of discussions and the drafting of proposals came 
to little.47 These efforts paralleled the development of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) code of conduct but this was perhaps not 
quite what had been intended by MCWD’s authors as not only did it have little in the 
 way of enforcement mechanisms, and implicitly rejecting the sixth proposal, it 
explicitly did not establish MNCs as subjects of international law. Moreover, as the 
OECD guidelines were an addition to its inter-governmental Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises many treated them with some 
scepticism seeing them as a way of heading off the development of a UN code.48  
Lastly while arbitration and conflict resolution mechanisms were increasingly 
deployed in the relations between states and MNCs, this was almost entirely 
privatised rather than being lodged in a multinational institution, and remains so four 
decades later. 
 
To a large extent MCWD was part of a brief flowering of developing country-led 
pressure for reform of the organisation of the increasingly global political economy. It 
sits in a context of debates around the NIEO alongside attempts (through the UN’s 
various agencies) to construct a system of regulation that would be less unbalanced 
towards the larger, most developed states and their businesses.49 As noted the 
report fed directly into the establishment of the UNCTC which for the first decade of 
its existence managed to retain a semblance of independence, reporting to 
ECOSOC not UNCTAD, and establishing a constructive engagement with many 
MNCs’ management teams around the development of a code of conduct for 
transnational business.50 However, while this may have also normalised the interest 
in corporate affairs within the UN, increasingly its work was perceived by some 
powerful countries as detrimental to the interests of their MNCs, and as such in the 
1990s it was closed (and collapsed into UNCTAD), in what Braithwaite and Drahos 
have called in their survey of globalised business regulation the ‘most extreme 
example of forum-shifting we have seen’.51 Moreover, often the UNCTC seems to be 
written out of history; by 2003 a South Centre report (jointly published with a UN 
agency) on UN-Business Partnerships,52 despite adopting a critical perspective on 
such developments, made no mention of the UNCTC or its work, mistakenly 
assuming that the UN’s engagement with corporations really only got under way with 
the UN Global Compact. Nevertheless, international organisations, latterly the 
institutions of global governance have kept the activities of MNCs in focus even if 
this has not produced any ‘hard’ regulatory structure. Likewise, one could argue that 
the UN-based critical research initiated by the UNCTC has continued to some extent 
both at the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and at the United 
Nations University, although both organisations are to one side of mainstream 
discussion of the contemporary practices and governance of global corporations.53  
 
The Ecuadorian Resolution (2014) 
 
Some forty years after MCWD, in a different forum – the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) – a clear statement of intent around their relations with MNCs was put 
forward by developing countries and adopted. This time the initiative was led by 
Ecuador, reflecting the country’s experience in a long running legal dispute with 
Chevron, which has involved the corporation seeking retrospective protection from a 
judicial decision on damages reached before any bilateral investment arbitration 
treaty was in force (the environmental damage at the centre of the case took place 
between 1964-1992, while the treaty was signed in 1993 and came into force in 
1997).54 The case then became focussed on how investor protection(s) in the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty might be interpreted and applied.55 However, due to 
Chevron’s lack of assets in Ecuador the original plaintiff’s only hope of restitution 
 was recognition of the judgment abroad; thus the case was initially litigated in 
Ecuador, but then ‘recognition proceedings’ were commenced in Canada as this was 
regarded as the most friendly jurisdiction in which to establish the international 
efficacy of the award of damages.56 The case also included claims of fraud against 
the plaintiff’s US lawyer, as well as a US legal finding that the Ecuadorian justice 
system was unreliable and subject to political direction.  
 
Space precludes a detailed account of the many twists and turns of this case, but the 
legal quagmire seems to have convinced the Ecuadorian government that current 
norms and codes have too little ability to hold corporations to account when a 
domestic court finds evidence of illegal environmental damage.57 Indeed, the case 
needs to be set in the context of President Rafeal Correa’s position that despite 
complaints and criticisms from various leftist groups it was possible to construct a 
beneficial political economy of extractive industries for Ecuador.58 Thus, to protect 
this position Correa’s government needed to demonstrate that it was attempting to 
neutralise the perceived power imbalance enjoyed by the corporations on which the 
extractive strategy at least partly depended. Moreover, Ecuador’s new (2008) 
constitution, reflecting more general trends in Latin American constitutionalism, 
shifted the state from being estado de derecho (essentially a limited liberal rule of 
law state) to the more expansive estado de derechos (in Spanish the one letter 
addition, adds ‘justice’ to the core reason of state)59 and as such Correa’s 
government (and the state more generally) now have a widened remit as regards 
relations with major corporate investors. 
 
Prior to Ecuador’s recent initiative John Ruggie reported that at the 2008 meeting of 
the UN Human Rights Council, at which the intent was to endorse the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, it was the Ecuadorian representative(s) 
who was the last to hold out against endorsing them because they were not legally 
binding. After some ‘back-channel work’ they agreed to endorse the principles to 
allow them to be consensually adopted.60 However, such acquiescence in this non-
legal approach was not to last, and while not necessarily wishing to completely 
dismiss the Guiding Principles, the Ecuadorian government representatives and their 
allies on the UNHRC subsequently sought to go beyond voluntary or civil regulation.  
 
Before moving to discuss the Ecuadorian Resolution, it is as well to note that 
Ruggie’s position while working for the UN was that legal instruments should be 
targeted on specific issues (for him, issues of corporate liability),61 while the 
Ecuadorian position was that there should be a much more comprehensive 
international legal instrument; the distance between these positions is really of 
degree rather than being completely incompatible. Nevertheless, in practical terms 
these two positions remain in tension and hence in 2014 the Ecuadorian government 
proposed developing such a comprehensive legal instrument. In the terms of the 
analysis set out in the first section, above, a gap (a contradiction) opened up 
between the continuing normative settlement on the regulatory value of guidelines 
(which the beneficiaries argued remained justified) and the Ecuadorian government’s 
experience of their efficacy, prompting a shift in their socio-political priorities for 
international policy-making, and their political actions.  
 
The Ecuadorian proposal, the ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding 
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect 
 to human rights’ runs to only two pages, and is important more for what it asserts is 
required than for any content one might infer from the document.62 While stressing 
the continuing responsibility of states to promote and protect human rights the 
resolution also ‘Emphasiz[es] that  transnational  corporations  and  other  business  
enterprises  have a responsibility to respect human rights’, before also 
‘Acknowledging that  transnational  corporations  and  other  business  enterprises  
have the  capacity  to  foster  economic  well-being, development,  technological  
improvement  and wealth, as well as causing adverse impacts on human rights’. As 
this indicates the resolution still seeks to establish clearly the MNCs can contribute to 
the ends desired by governments and populations in less-developed countries, as 
Correa’s government wished to maintain, thereby still retaining the overall position 
set out in MCWD some forty years before. 
 
This is then followed by nine articles which seek to establish an ‘open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on a legally binding instrument on transnational 
and other enterprises’ with the express purpose of drafting such a legally binding 
instrument after having taken evidence and representations from a range of experts. 
The articles include various aspects of a timetable of work, and ask the group to 
‘submit a report on progress made to the Human Rights Council for consideration at 
its thirty-first session’ (Spring 2016). Perhaps most controversially, the resolution 
included a footnote stating that ‘ “Other business enterprises” denotes all business 
enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities, and 
does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law’. This 
was intended to limit the group’s work to a legal instrument covering only global, 
transnational or multinational corporations while excluding state-owned enterprises 
or locally owned and incorporated enterprises. The resolution was adopted by the 
Human Rights Council with a vote of 20 states in favour, 14 against and 13 
abstentions, demonstrating a lack of overall consensus on the proposal(s). 
 
At the same session, and reflecting a range of countries’ disquiet at the Ecuadorian 
proposal, Norway offered a resolution which was focussed on already existing 
‘guiding principles’ for MNCs. Moreover, while the Ecuadorian resolution was 
exclusively concerned with the progress towards legally binding requirements for 
corporations, the Norwegian resolution sought to identify the range of existing 
mechanisms by which corporations could be encouraged to recognise and protect 
human rights.63 Moreover where legal instruments were mentioned these were 
exclusively national rather than inter- or trans-national. Across its 19 articles the 
Norwegian resolution identifies a number of ongoing projects related to guidelines, 
access to local/national legal institutions and the role of a range of stakeholders. This 
resolution was adopted by consensus which given its largely uncontroversial content 
is unsurprising, but enabled supporters of the guidelines and non-legal instruments 
to note that this approach garnered much more support than the resolution towards a 
legally binding regulatory regime.  
 
Having survived this attempt to marginalise its work, the open-ended working group 
presented its first report to the Human Rights Council in February 2016.64 Reporting 
on the first sessions that would lead to this report Katharine Valencia of the Due 
Process of Law Foundation observed that the controversial footnote in the 
Ecuadorian resolution caused some difficulty. While most (although not all) states’ 
representatives at the 2015 Geneva meeting regarded any attempt to widen the 
 scope of the discussion to be outside the working group’s explicit mandate, they also 
argued that it was transnational corporations for whom a new legal instrument was 
required, as domestic corporations mostly were unable to avoid the reach of national 
courts or enforcement institutions. Conversely, many of the civil society 
representatives and the European Union team regarded the focus as potentially 
allowing corporations to avoid any legal instrument by incorporating affiliates and 
subsidiaries locally.65 There was agreement that the working group should 
encompass all human rights, political and economic, and that while there was a 
perceived need to move beyond any guiding principles, these remained valuable and 
important. 
 
This initial meeting was also at least partly framed by a ‘concept note’ introduced by 
the chair of the meeting María Fernanda Espinosa, the Permanent Representative of 
Ecuador to the UN in Geneva. While setting out a number of procedural issues, the 
Ecuadorian statement elaborated on some aspects of the original resolution. Stating 
(again) the obligations of states regarding corporations’ actions relating to human 
rights abuse(s), the note stresses ‘the limitations of national measures and the need 
for greater clarity in regard to access to effective remedies’.66 It then goes on to 
argue: 
the international legal system reflects an asymmetry between rights and 
obligations of [MNCs]. While [MNCs] are granted rights through hard law 
instruments, such as bilateral investment treaties and investment rules in 
free trade agreements, and have access to a system of investor-state 
dispute settlement, there are no hard law instruments that address the 
obligations of corporations to respect human rights.67 
This is then linked to the expansion of global corporations’ supply and value chains, 
and argues that the expansion of regulatory scope over such networks would not 
have a detrimental impact on corporations’ economic efficiency or efficacy. The note 
set an agenda of discussion items ranging from a sharing of views on the likely 
substantive content of a legally binding instrument on corporations with respect to 
human rights, to a number of linked items including the current state of jurisprudence 
on this issue, the question of extraterritoriality and standards of liability and 
responsibility.  
 
The report of the working group, presented on 5th February 2016, six months after its 
initial meeting summarised the eight panel discussions as well as presenting the 
Chief Rapporteur’s digest of conclusions, which essentially agreed to develop a 
(revised) programme of work for the next session of the working group.68 The 
discussion in the eight panels involved representatives from: Algeria,   Argentina, 
Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El  Salvador, Ethiopia,  France, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,  India,  Indonesia,  Iran, Iraq,  Italy, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico,  
South Korea, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Namibia, the  
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, the Russian Federation, 
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela and Viet Nam. Notable exceptions were the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. These state representatives were joined by 
a number of international organisations:  the Organization for  Economic  
Cooperation  and  Development, the Council  of  Europe, the UN Entity for Gender   
 Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the UN Children’s Fund, the International 
Labour Organization, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the South 
Centre.  Representatives of the European Union attended some of the panels 
alongside a wide range of non-governmental organisations.69 
 
Discussions entertained a variety of views about the focus of any future legal 
instrument, and wide acceptance that although the extant and various ‘guiding 
principles’ represented a reasonable starting point these codes needed to be 
strengthened and complemented by a legally binding instrument. There was general 
agreement that  
the scope of the instrument should start with and include the core human 
rights instruments of the United Nations, especially those concerning the 
rights of vulnerable groups, such as children, indigenous peoples and 
people with disabilities. In this sense, States, NGOs and panellists 
signalled that a limitation on the scope of rights would be counter-
productive to the objectives of the instrument.70 
There was also a general recognition among participants that soft law and private 
regulatory instruments while offering some advances in human rights protection were 
insufficient in light of continuing difficulties in establishing corporate responsibility for 
violations. Some disagreement was evident across a number of panels about the 
responsibilities of states and how extraterritorial jurisdiction might be used (and/or 
abused), but overall ‘most delegations underlined that a future instrument should 
clearly set out the direct obligations of corporations to respect human rights’.71 
Thus, overall the session explored a range of issues of direct relevance to the 
building of a legally binding instrument, identified both areas of some 
commonality but also those over which some states and NGOs differed as 
regarded the best way forward (for instance as regards the range of human rights 
that might be best prioritised). 
 
The open-ended working group, then, at present has been more a project of 
mapping a range of issues and difficulties that would need to be addressed by any 
attempt to draft a treaty that would establish a legally binding instrument on the 
conduct of global corporations relating to human rights. That the working group is 
slow moving should be no surprise given the likely contentious character of the 
issues under discussion. Therefore, as it is around forty years since a similar set of 
discussions were set in train by the work to establish UNCTC in the concluding 
section I seek to contrast and compare these two sets of discussions as a way of 
assessing how much (or how little) has been achieved by the attempt to establish a 
formal legal regime for the conduct of corporations in the global political economy. 
 
The two moments compared 
 
The two moments I have highlighted above are divided by forty years and while 
much has changed, there is also some (albeit unsurprising) continuity. In these forty 
years the global networks though which corporations organise their activities have 
become more complex, building on the type of relations MCWD identified but 
increasing in their density, reach and complexity while also utilising a range of ‘off-
shore’ jurisdictions to obscure both the shape and flow around these networks as 
well as their beneficial owners. Moreover, global corporations are much more 
involved in internationalised production (with extensive supply chains) relative to 
 extraction than they were forty years ago, although extractive MNCs remain major 
players in the global corporate economy. However, at the same time, the networks of 
influence in which corporate interests are articulated and mediated have become 
more open; although not directly comparable, the Trilateral Commission while hardly 
secret was not well known; annual meetings of the World Economic Forum are a 
global media event, while remaining a site of corporate influence brokering. Perhaps 
most interestingly, while the MCWD’s researchers suggested that international tax 
competition was equally unwelcome to states and MNCs, it would now seem to be 
clear (and perhaps should have been forty years ago) that corporations have utilised 
tax competition to greatly reduce their global tax exposure, but states have often 
colluded in this activity. Of course, this issue has now become the subject of the very 
data collection and transparency advocated by MCWD’s authors, vindicating their 
assumption that political responses to (global) corporate practice(s) need(ed) better 
information.  
 
If Multinational Corporations in World Development was meant to prompt an 
expansion of research into multinational (and global) corporations, it can be seen as 
a success. The report established the contours of such research and was a key 
element in the setting up of the UNCTC. While the centre itself did not survive, the 
agenda of research activity has continued, and there is now a wealth of authoritative 
data and information of the activities of corporations across the global political 
economy. Thus, one of the key achievements of the MCWD report was to establish 
this need for a regular and public record of the activities of MNCs; in the pre-internet 
period this was achieved through a series of regular updates on the original report.72 
These subsequent reports appeared in 1978, 1985 and 1988, before at the start of 
the 1990s being reconfigured into the annual World Investment Report (WIR) that 
continues until today. However, the move to the annual WIR also subtly shifted the 
grounds for discussion of globally active corporations, to a focus on foreign direct 
investment as the key indicator of corporate activity and behaviour.73 More generally, 
the normalisation of the UN’s regular data gathering on MNCs’ activity represents the 
context in which the discussion of the Ecuadorian proposal could take place.  
 
This enhanced transparency as regards corporate activity, although clearly not the 
only driver towards expanded civil society interest and engagement in this area has 
certainly supported such political development(s). The hope that states’ governments 
would be able to utilise this information to coordinate their activities better to counter 
(or perhaps moderate) the influence of corporations has been less evident. The 
continuation of tax competition suggests that while states may know more about 
what corporations are doing they find it difficult to forego offering advantageous tax 
treatment. Nevertheless, there has been some action against a range of tax 
practises in the guise of an increasingly intolerant view of tax havens (albeit driven 
more by issues of terrorist financing) but as recent moves by the European Union 
against both Ireland and Luxembourg indicate, the use of tax incentives to secure 
preferential inward investment remains a key element of international relations. That 
said, civil society pressure groups (such as Tax Justice Network) have also been 
able to use greater data availability to develop political campaigns (and exert 
pressure on some states) on the issue of corporate tax avoidance and evasion.  
 
The fourth & fifth recommendations set out in MCDW unfortunately reveal how little 
has changed in relation to the legal aspect of the issue, as these are essentially 
 repeated in the Ecuadorian proposal. The authors of MCDW, as the meeting of the 
Human Rights Council did forty years later, accepted that codes and principles were 
a welcome starting point but needed to be the precursor to more formal international 
regulation not an alternative to legal instruments. In the 1970s there was a hope (I 
hesitate to say expectation) that the existing and developing codes and principles 
would be the basis on which an international law of corporate practice could be built. 
However, what has actually transpired is a little different. There has been a clear 
move to establish a range of rights for corporations, with few if any associated legal 
responsibilities.  
 
Indeed, the reaction to the MCWD and the establishment of the UNCTC in US 
government circles in the early 1970s was focussed on seeking to protect the ‘rights’ 
of MNCs.74 Whatever the formal considerations, global corporations enjoy a range of 
rights, including intellectual property protection, and the protection of investments 
from appropriation (through the now contentious investor arbitration elements of free 
trade agreements), which they are able to defend via legal means. These rights are 
not infrequently contrasted with the lack of legal enforcement around the 
responsibilities for corporations that have been expressed in various sets of 
guidelines (from the OECD guidelines to the expressly advisory UN Global 
Compact). Indeed, at the centre of the Ecuadorian proposal is exactly this disparity 
between hard rights and soft responsibilities (as noted above).  
 
Again, a collective actor (here Ecuador) has identified a contradiction – here around 
the enjoyment of rights – and has developed their political actions accordingly. So, 
despite MCWD’s professed aim of establishing MNC as legal subjects under 
international law, MNCs remain without international legal personality when their 
putative responsibilities are discussed. As the Ecuadorian proposal points out, 
corporations are happy to have their legal personality recognised where their rights 
are concerned. Conversely, critics have argued that the confusion that such 
allocation of transnational rights would produce should prompt international lawers to 
return to a more focussed recognition of subjectivity being limited to states.75  
 
The Ecuadorian proposal on legal personality does not merely represents the 
product of the country’s own history, and the forty year development of the regulation 
of MNCs, it also reflects some critical analyses in international legal scholarship. As 
Karsten Nowrot put it: 
The current predominant view concerning the prerequisites of 
international legal personality is neither compatible with the central aim of 
the current international legal order, nor is it reflective of the resulting 
necessity for international law to be in sufficient conformity with the 
changing realties of the international system…In an economic as well as 
political sense [corporations] are among the most influential participants in 
the current international system, thereby being endowed with a 
considerable potential to positively contribute to, but also to frustrate the 
promotion and protection of global public goods.76 
Thus, as the Ecuadorian proposal makes clear, the legal asymmetry currently 
patterning global corporations’ international legal character cannot continue if the 
international legal system is to be fully mapped onto the forms and practices one 
finds in the global political economy. In the terms utilised in the first section, political 
 actors are seeking to resolve a political contradiction, not by amending their account 
of legal legitimacy but by trying to shift the ecology or regulation for MNCs.  
 
Likewise, as reflected in Ecuador’s own recent legal struggles with Chevron, the 
move to try and reinvigorate debates about formal legal regulations of global 
corporations also reflects a shift in the arbitration environment around Investor-State 
disputes. As Kyla Tienhaara has suggested in the last decade  
several investment provisions have been interpreted in such a broad 
manner that it would appear that (at least some) arbitrators believe that it 
is within their purview to review any state regulatory action, or indeed 
inaction, that has a negative (not necessarily devastating) impact on a 
foreign investor or investment.77 
This expansion of remit has been allowed by the relatively vague language of earlier 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, and the increasing competition between arbitration 




Although the agenda set out in MCDW has in many ways has been achieved, if not 
in quite the institutional form that was imagined forty years ago, the key remaining 
issue is the manner in which the legal developments identified for development have 
played out subsequently. While pragmatically global corporations are often treated 
as having legal personality, this has not led to the establishment of international 
regulatory instrument also focussing on their purported responsibilities rather than 
just their rights; one might summarise the situation as corporations are able to enjoy 
an elective and partial legal subjectivity. 
 
At the UN Human Rights Council, there was a move among those states unwilling to 
support the Ecuadorian initiative to (again) stress that focussed legal instruments 
were more effective than a more general law of corporations. Certainly there has 
been a move in various jurisdictions to make laws (especially around environmental 
issues) that seek to regulate corporate activity, but for ‘weaker’ states these have 
become tokens in bargaining to secure investment rather than hard or robust 
regulation. Moreover, and against the hopes of forty years ago, many corporations 
still manage to play states governments off against each other to secure preferential 
treatment, as recent tax-related revelations have clearly exposed.  
 
It is unlikely that the UN Human Rights Council will achieve its aspiration to establish 
a formal and enforceable international legal instrument to regulate corporate 
behaviour. What the forty years between the two moments I have considered here 
demonstrates is that where the agenda laid in MCWD was broadly neutral or 
advantageous to the corporate sector there has been a willingness to move forward 
in various ways, harnessing various states and international organisations. However 
where the agenda was seen to be against corporate interests, there has been 
considerably less movement, with activity being diverted into voluntary codes and 
principles, including but by no means limited to the UN Global Compact. This is not 
to say that these codes or principles are worthless, but rather that this history offers 
a clear and long running example of the impact corporate interest(s) has/have on 
global political deliberation and institutionalisation. The strength of corporate social 
forces to resist the collective political action prompted by the perceptions of 
 contradictions between promise and delivery of benefits, may drive actions like those 
of the Ecuadorian government but they remain constrained (at present at least) by 
the structures of political power evident in the global system. Certainly, much has 
been achieved in the last forty years and this should not in any way been gainsaid 
but equally it is instructive to recognise exactly what has not been achieved against 
the agenda set four decades ago.  
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